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Peer production phenomena such as open source software (OSS) have been posited as a viable alternative totraditional production models. However, community-based development often falls short of creating soft-
ware “products” in the sense that consumers understand. Our research identifies an emerging business network
archetype in the OSS sector, the open source service network (OSSN), which seeks to address the “productiza-
tion” challenge. To do so, OSSNs must overcome the problems associated with exchanging resources between
firms. We demonstrate that OSSNs overcome exchange problems by primarily relying on social, rather than
legal, mechanisms; similar to the OSS communities from which they emerged. This is made possible because
OSSNs use IT infrastructures that provide high visibility for primary value-creating activities. The research
utilizes a multimethod theory-building approach, deriving a model from extant research, refining the model
through qualitative case study analysis, and further refining the model through quantitative analysis of survey
data. The paper reveals the manifestation of social mechanisms in OSSNs and how these are used for coordinat-
ing and safeguarding exchanges between firms. Specifically, we illustrate the primary importance of a shared
macroculture (goals and norms) and collective sanctions for punishing firms who violate these goals/norms.
Furthermore, our research highlights the interplay between digital and social networks within OSSNs, demon-
strating that the use of social mechanisms is inherently dependent upon the underlying IT infrastructure.
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1. Introduction
! ! !Whenever you have a commons, somebody is going
to be the shark and try to hijack the commons, and
have a winner take all mentality. And you can fight
back in the courts, but that takes a lot of time; com-
panies are dead before you get remedied and it’s a
lot of money. So we’re trying to introduce [a different
approach], if you get kicked out of the network, that’s
just as bad as getting sued, as word will get around
to your potential customers ! ! !This is an opt-in kind of
system—social mechanisms are what really underpin
that. Getting into the network is only the first part. If
you want to do transactions with other people in the
network or on a network bid, then you need to show
yourself to be competent and professional.
—Paul Everitt, Founder of the Zea Partners network,
speaking to the authors after the network won a con-
tract (against 10 other bidders) for the development
of a multilingual Content Management System for a
multinational organization with over 3,000 partners in
more than 100 countries.
Peer production has been posited as an alterna-
tive model for organizing production without reliance
on markets, managerial hierarchies, property, and
contracts (Benkler 2002, 2006). Peer production is
characterized by the decentralized accumulation and
exchange of information (Benkler 2002, 2006), and is
seen as potentially superior to traditional hierarchy
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andmarket-based models (cf. Coase 1937, Hayek 1945)
as a mechanism for discovering/applying human
skill and knowledge to the creation of informa-
tion resources. Peer production is manifested in
a number of ways; collaborative authorship (e.g.
Wikipedia.org), user-generated content and meta-
content (e.g. YouTube.com, Del.icio.us), and vari-
ous forms of “open innovation” (cf. Chesbrough
2003). However, the most well-established example
of peer production is open source software (Benkler
2002, 2006).
The collaborative creation of open source software
is enabled by (1) licensing terms that allow the soft-
ware to be freely used, modified and redistributed;
(2) the activities of geographically distributed net-
works of individuals and organizations; and (3) the
use of mediating digital networks—comprising e-mail
and mailing lists, websites and bulletin boards, Inter-
net relay chat, bug tracking, and version control sys-
tems, etc. (Markus et al. 2000, Robbins 2005).
Although there are many successful exemplars of
open source software (e.g., Mozilla, Apache, Linux),
the community-based peer production of software
often falls short of creating customized software prod-
ucts in the sense that individual and corporate con-
sumers understand. Overcoming this shortcoming has
been aptly described by Woods and Guliani (2005) as
the need to “productize” open source service (OSS)
to meet the needs of both corporate enterprises and
individual end users.
Research to date on the commercialization of OSS
has focused on revenue generation models (e.g.,
Krishnamurthy 2005, Markus et al. 2000) and has
been dominated by studies of single firms; whether
OSS start-ups such as RedHat and JBoss (e.g.,
Krishnamurthy 2005, Watson et al. 2005) or very large
multinationals like Apple, IBM, and Sun (e.g., West
2003). However, to effectively productize OSS for cor-
porate users there is a need for service providers to
(i) marry community-driven development capabilities
with high levels of sector knowledge in vertical busi-
ness domains, and (ii) build business models capa-
ble of a “whole product” approach to software and
service delivery. Consequently, productizing OSS is
often beyond the capabilities of many OSS firms; sug-
gesting the need for cooperative business networks
(cf. Fitzgerald 2006, Feller et al. 2008).
We have identified one type of OSS business net-
work, similar in character to what (Clemons and Row
1992) term a “move-to-the middle,” i.e., networks of
organizations that cooperate in order to deliver value
to the end consumer. We have labeled this network
type an open source service network (OSSN), which
we define as follows:
Open Source Service Network: A network of firms that
collaborate in order to service customer software needs
based on open source solutions.
To clarify the OSSN concept, network is understood to
mean a collaborative network with interdependencies
between member firms, and a shared identity. This
differentiates OSSNs from noninterdependent group-
ings, such as third-party directories and portals list-
ing OSS firms. Furthermore, the primary purpose of
the network is to commercially service customer soft-
ware needs based on open source solutions. This differ-
entiates OSSNs from noncommercial groupings such
as advocacy networks, nonprofit foundations, devel-
opment hosts, and research communities, as well as
business networks offering solely proprietary solu-
tions (see Table 1).
OSSNs require the flow of resources amongst non-
hierarchical and legally separate entities. Thus, its
successful operation is dependent on overcoming
exchange problems amongst participant firms. Most
business networks rely on formal/legal mechanisms
to overcome exchange problems (Jones et al. 1997).
Open source development communities, in contrast,
rely on informal/social mechanisms to do so (Markus
et al. 2000, Bergquist and Ljungberg 2001, Hars and
Ou 2002). Social mechanisms are effective in OSS
communities because their IT infrastructure makes
the communication and collaboration activities of
the community persistently visible to all participants
(Sagers 2004). OSSNs have inherited much of their IT
infrastructure from OSS communities; thus enabling
the use of social mechanisms to overcome exchange
problems. OSSNs are, thus, particularly noteworthy
as commercial business networks in that they are
shaped by the informal ethos and operational style
of the OSS communities from which they originated,
and with which they continue to interact.
The objective of our study is to explore how social
mechanisms are used to overcome exchange prob-
lems, and thus facilitate the access to, and transfer
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Table 1 Characterization of Open Source Service Networks
3rd party directories Not-for-profit
and portals (e.g., organizations Proprietary software
SourceForge.net (e.g. Apache service providers (e.g.,
OSSN marketplace) software foundation) Microsoft partner program)
Interdependency High levels of interdependency
between members
No interdependency between
members
High levels of interdependency
between members
Low levels of interdependency
between members
Shared identify Member firms possess a shared
network identity
No shared identity Shared identity exists but
plays a minor role in brand
building
Shared identity used in brand
building
Focus of services Network/members commercially
service the software needs of
customers
Commercially services the
discovery needs of
customers as they seek
solution and/or providers,
but does not directly
service the customer’s
software needs
Services user software needs
but not on commercial
basis
Network/members commercially
service the software needs
of customers
Value offering and
OSS
Value offer is dependent on open
source software
Value offer is dependent on
open source software
Value offer is dependent on
open source software
Value offer relies exclusively
on proprietary software
Mechanisms for
overcoming
exchange problems
Primarily informal None needed (there is no
interdependency, so there
is no need to overcome
exchange problems)
Mixture of informal and
formal
Formal mechanisms are civic
(e.g., voting mechanisms)
rather than contractual
Less need for mechanisms
because there are low
levels of interdependency
Primarily use formal
mechanisms that are
legal/contractual in nature
Digital infrastructure Infrastructure builds on the
collaborative development
environment of open source “in
the wild”—Maximizing
persistent visibility of action
and emphasizing interaction
over transaction support
Infrastructure is focused on
facilitating customer
discovery needs, not
interaction between firms
listed
Infrastructure builds on the
collaborative development
environment of open
source “in the wild”—
Maximizing persistent
visibility of action and
emphasizing interaction
over transaction support
Infrastructure builds on
traditional interorganiza-
tional systems emphasizing
transaction support over
interaction
of, strategic resources in OSSNs. We first begin a pro-
cess of theory building with an analysis of extant
research; delineating constructs and the relationships
between these constructs in the form of theoretical
propositions (§2). We then use a case study of one
OSSN to refine our propositions, determine empirical
indicators, and propose hypotheses (§3). This is fol-
lowed by a survey and quantitative analysis of three
additional OSSNs (§4). Finally, we conclude by dis-
cussing the implications of our work for research and
practice (§5).
2. Building a Preliminary Model
from Extant Research
In this section, we theorize how participants in
OSSNs may use social mechanisms to overcome
exchange problems. Our theorizing is posited on the
OSSN phenomenon being a critical intersection be-
tween (1) cooperative business networks and (2) the
communities of OSS developers from which OSSN
members emerged, and with which they continue to
interact. Both cooperative business networks and OSS
communities can be viewed as social networks com-
prising individuals/organizations, whose interactions
are mediated by a digital network infrastructure. We
therefore use extant literature on (1) business networks
and (2) OSS communities in order to conceptualize
the phenomenon and to serve as a guide for data
gathering—an approach recommended by Forrester
(1961) and Wheeler (2002). Specifically, we utilize the
building blocks of theory development proposed by
Dubin (1969) and Whetten (1989) to delineate con-
structs as well as the relationships between these con-
structs in the form of theoretical propositions.
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2.1. Network Effectiveness
Whereas business networks of OSS firms are an
emerging phenomenon, cooperative relationships
between independent firms (interorganizational net-
works) have been examined for decades (cf. Kaufman
1966, Van de Ven 1976, Cash and Konsynski 1985,
Henderson 1990, Finnegan et al. 2003). An exami-
nation of the extant literature on business networks
reveals that firms participate in such networks in
order to procure and allocate resources (Galaskiewicz
1985, Clemons and Row 1992, Alter and Hage
1993), gain political advantages (Galaskiewicz 1985),
share risk and acquire expertise (Alter and Hage
1993), improve stability (Oliver 1990), gain legitimacy
(Galaskiewicz 1985, Oliver 1990), improve efficiency
(Oliver 1990, Clemons and Row 1992), and facilitate
innovation (Ticoll et al. 1998). Indeed, participants in
cooperative networks believe that collaboration will
result in adaptive efficiency; “the ability to change
rapidly and at the same time provide customized ser-
vices or products, and at low cost” (Alter and Hage
1993, p. 274). De Wever et al. (2005) capture these rea-
sons for participation at a higher level by arguing that
effective interfirm networks provide participants with
sustainable access to strategic (or value-generating)
resources. These concepts are also evident in research
on OSS communities where developers network with
each other to acquire knowledge and other strate-
gic resources (Crowston and Scozzi 2002), including
legal indemnity and contractual identity (Koch and
Schneider 2002, German 2003, O’Mahony 2003). We
are, therefore, able to identify two aspects of network
effectiveness for use in our study:
• Access to strategic resources: The potential of
the network to help members acquire value-adding
resources, and
• Transfer of strategic resources: The degree to which
value-adding resources are acquired by firms as a
result of their membership of the network.
As well as providing access to strategic resources,
interfirm cooperation introduces (i) the cost of coor-
dinating activities amongst partners and (ii) trans-
action risk; opportunistic behavior by one or more
partners reducing or eliminating the benefits of co-
operating (Clemons and Row 1992). Research illus-
trates that effective networks must overcome such
exchange problems by making it easy and safe for
members to work together (cf. Jones et al. 1997, 1998).
Research has also illustrated that OSS communities
must coordinate and safeguard exchanges if they are
to distribute work and code ownership (Mockus et al.
2002), as well as to acquire knowledge and other
strategic resources (Crowston and Scozzi 2002). We
therefore identify two constructs for use in our study:
• Coordinating Exchanges: The ease with which in-
teractions between members are conducted, and
• Safeguarding Exchanges: The degree to which in-
teractions between members are protected.
Building on the research discussed above, we can
now present our first proposition:
Proposition 1. Coordinating exchanges and safe-
guarding exchanges enable the access to, and transfer of,
strategic resources.
2.2. Overcoming Exchange Problems
Having examined the necessity for effective networks
to overcome exchange problems by coordinating and
safeguarding participant exchanges, we now turn our
attention to how such coordination and safeguarding
can be accomplished.
Cooperative business relationships are social action
systems because they exhibit the fundamental prin-
ciples of any organized form of collective behavior,
namely, that members aim to achieve collective and
self-interest goals, the division of tasks and functions
among members creates interdependent processes,
and the cooperative entity can act as a unit and has a
separate identity from its members (Van de Ven 1976).
Such relationships are typified by formal structured
coordination mechanisms and agreements in order for
individual organizations to meet their own goals, as
well as the goals of the cooperative entity (Van de
Ven and Walker 1984). This usually involves upfront
contract negotiations that deal with the form of the
contract, the form of the legal entity created, and the
political, legal, taxation, and cartel concerns (Bronder
and Pritzl 1992).
Although cooperative business networks gener-
ally rely on formal mechanisms, an alternative
approach to coordinating and safeguarding exchanges
exists. Network governance is where “interfirm coor-
dination [is] characterized by organic or informal
social systems, in contrast to bureaucratic structures
within firms and formal contractual relationships
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between them” (Jones et al. 1997, p. 913). There are
four preconditions for network governance: demand
uncertainty, customized (asset-specific) exchanges,
complex tasks executed under time pressure, and
frequent exchanges between partners. Under such
conditions, networks develop structural embedded-
ness (the extent to which a “dyad’s mutual con-
tacts are connected to one another” Granovetter
1992, p. 35); creating both direct and indirect ties
between parties, and increasing the visibility of the
parties’ actions. The presence of high levels of struc-
tural embeddedness and visibility of action enables
the use of various social mechanisms to resolve
exchange problems by coordinating and safeguarding
exchanges within networks (Jones et al. 1997, 1998).
OSS communities are recognized as a form of vir-
tual organization (Markus et al. 2000, Crowston and
Scozzi 2002), and, thus, may use either formal or
informal mechanisms in coordinating and safeguard-
ing exchanges. However, OSS communities tend to
rely on implicit and informal (i.e., social) mechanisms
(Markus et al. 2000, Gallivan 2001, Bergquist and
Ljungberg 2001, Hars and Ou 2002, Mockus et al.
2002, Stewart 2005, Szczepanska et al. 2005), and dis-
play the characteristics and dynamics of network gov-
ernance (Sagers 2004).
We argue that the tendency towards the use of
formal mechanisms in business networks, and social
mechanisms in OSS communities, is due not only
to differences in their dominant cultural values, but
also the characteristics and usage of their digital
networks. We argue that the continued dominance
of formal mechanisms to overcome exchange prob-
lems in business networks is influenced by the fact
that the IT infrastructures implemented in these net-
works facilitate transactions (e.g., orders, invoices,
etc., cf. Timmers 1999), and hence do not provide
the visibility of action required for social mecha-
nisms to be effective. OSS communities, on the other
hand, operate IT infrastructures that facilitate inter-
action rather than transaction, and thus, the main
value-adding communication and collaboration activ-
ities of the community are persistently visible to par-
ticipants (cf. Feller and Fitzgerald 2001, Egyedi and
van Wendel de Joode 2004, Robbins 2005).
We assert that the ongoing participation of OSSN
firms in OSS communities will require adherence
to the OSS digital infrastructures and prevailing
social mechanisms, and, thus, arrive at our second
proposition:
Proposition 2. Social mechanisms facilitate coordinat-
ing exchanges and safeguarding exchanges.
2.3. Coordinating and Safeguarding Exchanges
with Social Mechanisms
We now analyze Proposition 2 by determining what
types of social mechanisms might be used for (a) coor-
dinating exchanges and (b) safeguarding exchanges.
In business networks where high levels of struc-
tural embeddedness and visibility of action are pre-
sent, coordinating exchanges can be achieved through
two social mechanisms (Jones et al. 1997, 1998):
Restricted Access (the “strategic reduction in the num-
ber of exchange partners in the network,” Jones et al.
1997, p. 927) and Macroculture (a “system of widely
shared assumptions and values ! ! ! that guide actions
and create typical behavior patterns among indepen-
dent entities,” Jones et al. 1997, p. 929).
Although OSS development communities are po-
tentially global in size, there is evidence that OSS
projects implement forms of restricted access both
organizationally (e.g., small core development teams)
and technologically (e.g., commit privileges to ver-
sioning systems, separate mailing lists for users and
developers, etc.) to facilitate the coordination of ex-
changes (cf. Jorgensen 2001, Koch and Schneider
2002, Mockus et al. 2002, German 2003, Robbins
2005, Sagers 2004). Additionally, a common ethos and
world view, a shared set of goals and a consen-
sus surrounding “how things should be done” has
been repeatedly observed as contributing to the effec-
tive coordination of activity within OSS communities
(Markus et al. 2000, Bergquist and Ljungberg 2001,
Gallivan 2001, Raymond 2001, Hars and Ou 2002,
Sagers 2004, Dahlander and Magnusson 2005, Stewart
2005, Szczepanska et al. 2005). We therefore add two
more constructs and delineate a further proposition.
• Restricted Access: Having network membership
restricted for strategic purposes, and
• Macroculture: Having shared assumptions and
values that guide actions and create typical behavior
patterns by member firms.
Proposition 2A. Restricted access and macroculture
facilitate coordinating exchanges.
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Given the appropriate conditions, business net-
works can safeguard exchanges using restricted ac-
cess (previously described), collective sanctions (ways
in which groups punish members who violate shared
norms, values, and goals; Jones et al. 1997, p. 931), and
reputation (“estimations of one’s character, skills, reli-
ability, and other attributes important to exchanges;”
Jones et al. 1997, p. 932).
Within OSS communities, restricted access to the
membership of core development team (including the
technological restriction of who can commit modifi-
cations to code) is seen to reduce the risk introduced
by the open nature of the OSS development process
(Jorgensen 2001, Koch and Schneider 2002, Mockus
et al. 2002, German 2003, Robbins 2005, Sagers 2004).
In addition, reputation is a mechanism for assessing
the capabilities and intentions of others (Bergquist
and Ljungberg 2001, Gallivan 2001, Hars and Ou
2002, Sagers 2004, Stewart 2005, Szczepanska et al.
2005). Finally, collective sanctions, in the form of humil-
iation and rebuke (e.g. flaming) and the exclusion
and ostracizing of individuals is a mechanism by
which OSS communities can manage individuals that
transgress or violate agreed-upon norms (Bergquist
and Ljungberg 2001, Sagers 2004, Szczepanska et al.
2005). Therefore, we add two further constructs and
delineate our final proposition:
• Collective Sanctions: Ways in which member firms
that violate shared norms, values, and goals are pun-
ished, and
• Reputation: The assessment of firms’ competence,
skills, character, reliability, etc. within the network.
Proposition 2B. Restricted access, collective sanc-
tions, and reputation facilitate safeguarding exchanges.
We now conclude our process of building a prelim-
inary model from extant research by presenting the
constructs and the proposed relationships between
them (as Propositions 1, 2A, and 2B) in Figure 1.
3. Refining the Preliminary Model
Using a Case Study of One OSSN
In building a theory, the steps following the specifi-
cation of propositions are (i) determining empirical
indicators and (ii) producing hypotheses for empirical
testing (cf. Wheeler 2002). In this section we use a case
Figure 1 Preliminary Model
study to (i) determine empirical indicators for the con-
structs in our model and (ii) specify hypotheses for
further refinement of our model using a survey (§4).
We adopt a postpositivist epistemology and seek
to “approximate reality” (Guba 1990) using meth-
ods that emphasize the verification of existing knowl-
edge and the discovery of new knowledge (Denzin
and Lincoln 2000). Our method is consistent with the
case study approach of Benbasat et al. (1987) and Yin
(1994) in that we study the OSSN phenomenon in
its natural setting, employing multiple data collection
methods to gather information from a few entities,
without employing experimental control or manipu-
lation. We thus follow in the tradition of Eisenhardt
(1989) and Madill et al. (2000) by seeking to reveal
preexisting, relatively stable, and objectively extant
phenomena and the relationships among them.
3.1. Participants and Data Collection Procedures
Zea Partners was founded in 2003 as the Zope
Europe Association (ZEA), and changed its name
to Zea Partners in 2006. Headquartered in Belgium,
Zea Partners operates as an international network
of businesses that build software and deliver ser-
vices around the application server technology called
Zope; a well-known piece of open-source software
widely used for developing content management sys-
tems, intranets, portals, and related applications. Zea
Partners consists of 25 firms located in Argentina,
Belgium, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Ireland,
Italy, Netherlands, Norway, South Africa, Spain,
Feller et al.: A Study of Socially Enabled Business Exchanges in Open Source Service Networks
Information Systems Research 19(4), pp. 475–493, © 2008 INFORMS 481
Table 2 Data Sources for the Qualitative Study
Interviews Founder Zea (five interviews)
CEO Zea (three interviews)
Founder, Infrae
Director BlueFountain
Chief Architect, Plone Solutions
Owner, Zetwork
Owner, Gocept
Owner, Reflab
Owner, Zest Software
Owner, Bubblenet
Workshops with ZEA members The Hague, The Netherlands
Paris, France
Genoa, Italy
Skovde, Sweden
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United
States. The management team seeks project contracts
on behalf of network members and performs net-
work management activities such as marketing and
project management. They also develop the network’s
business strategy in conjunction with the managing
partners.
Data for the case study were gathered over a
17-month period; focusing on the management team
and member companies. Data-gathering techniques
included intensive workshops, face-to-face interviews,
and telephone interviews (see Table 2). The choice of
interviewees was based on:
1. History of network involvement. Interviewees had
to have been involved in ongoing network planning
and/or project activity over a period of time.
2. Seniority. In order to get contextual material on
business strategy and experience with network activi-
ties, it was necessary to speak with senior staff within
partner firms.
The interview guide approach (cf. Patton 1980) was
used to conduct the interviews because it is more
comprehensive and systematic for data collection than
the purely conversational interview and more flexi-
ble than the standardized, open-ended interview or
the closed, fixed-response interview. Interviews were
generally of one- to two-hour duration with follow-up
telephone conversations and e-mails used to clarify
and refine issues that emerged during transcription.
Interviews were complemented by comprehensive
reviews of documents and presentations/discussions
at the workshops.
3.2. Data Analysis
Interview data were transcribed, generating 133 pages
of field notes. Content analysis was undertaken using
grounded theory coding techniques proposed by
Strauss and Corbin (1990) and exemplified by the
research of Orlikowski (1993) and Urquhart (1997).
This approach is consistent with a postpositivist
epistemology (cf. Charmaz 2000). It necessitates the
researchers to be immersed in the data (Glaser and
Strauss 1967) and to draw on existing theoretical
knowledge without imposing a theory (Corbin and
Strauss 1990, Urquhart 1997). It thus encourages the
researcher to be flexible and creative (Sarker et al.
2000) while imposing systematic coding procedures
(Strauss and Corbin 1990).
The first step (open coding) involved the data being
examined “line by line” to ascertain the main ideas.
These were then grouped by meaningful headings
(informed by constructs developed in §2) to reveal
categories and subcategories/properties. The next
step (axial coding) was the process of determining
hypotheses about the relationships between a cate-
gory and its subcategories—e.g., conditions, context,
action/interaction strategies, and consequences. The
focus then turned to the data to assess the validity of
these hypothesized relationships. Relational and varia-
tional sampling (cf. Strauss and Corbin 1990) were used
to select data for this analysis. This process continued
in an iterative manner and resulted in the modifica-
tion of categories and relationships. Finally, selective
coding was undertaken to identify the relationships
between categories (constructs) using hypothesized
conditions, context, strategies, and consequences. Dis-
criminate sampling (cf. Strauss and Corbin 1990) was
used to select data to examine strong and weak con-
nections between categories.
The issues of trustworthiness (validity) and replica-
bility (reliability) (cf. Denzin and Lincoln 2000, Gay
et al. 2006) were addressed as follows. First, the data
analysis approach utilized rigorous coding and memo-
ing processes providing an audit trail of the process
by which conclusions are reached. Second, the coding
was undertaken by two of the researchers. Third, vent-
ing (cf. Goetz and LeCompte 1984) was used as results
and interpretations were formally discussed with Zea
Partners representatives and fellow researchers at the
various workshops (see Table 2).
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Table 3 Zea Partners as an Open Source Service Network
Characteristics ZEA partners
Interdependency Member firms collaborate to fulfill contractual
obligations and rely on expertise and
resources from other firms
Shared identify The network has a legal identity outside of the
member firms, and member firms reference
this identity as part of their corporate brand
building activity
Focus of services Acting both independently and through the
network, member firms seek to deliver
services to customers on a commercial basis
Value offering and
OSS
The services delivered by the network and by the
individual member firms are based on the
productization of the Zope open source
application server and related OSS products
Mechanisms for
overcoming
exchange problems
Informal mechanisms including strategic
restrictions to network membership, a shared
set of goals and norms, and collective
sanctions against violations of goals/norms in
the form of damage to reputation, exclusion
from projects, and expulsion from the network
Digital infrastructure Heavy reliance on the Internet-based
communication and collaboration
infrastructure used in OSS communities
3.3. Case Study: Analysis and Results
This section outlines the case study of Zea Partners.
Table 3 illustrates how the network is characteris-
tic of an OSSN. From the case study data, we are
able to (i) identify empirical indicators for the con-
structs (Tables 4 and 5), (ii) illustrate how the four
social mechanisms facilitate coordinating exchanges
(Table 6) and safeguarding exchanges (Table 7), and
(iii) generate hypotheses for further refinement of the
model (Figure 2).
3.3.1. How Coordinating and Safeguarding Ex-
changes Enable Access to, and Transfer of, Strategic
Resources. The member firms of Zea Partners con-
sider the network to be effective because it allows
them to access and transfer strategic resources. Specif-
ically, the study indicates five strategic resources
which can be accessed/transferred: enhanced reputa-
tion, skills/expertise, customer contacts, experiences/
knowledge, and the ability to compete for contracts.
The owner of one member firm (BubbleNet) describes
how network membership affects customers’ percep-
tions of risk; “that may be the biggest advantage,
because as I am a one-man shop people can feel that
it is a big risk to work with me because if some-
thing were to happen to me they would be left with-
out a service provider.” The network founder asserts
that; “[instead of] companies turning away customers,
with the network they can still land the customer
and have someone else fulfill it ! ! !They still have the
customer relationship” and argues that such resource
sharing allows Zea Partners to “take the ‘whole prod-
uct’ and make it offerable by anyone in the net-
work. It has so many benefits on profitability it’s just
amazing.”
It is evident that membership of Zea Partners, in
itself, can provide access to certain strategic resources
(e.g., enhanced reputation). However, member firms
reported the necessity for all network members to
continuously act in a professional, competent and
trustworthy manner in order to ensure access to
and transfer of other strategic resources (e.g., skills,
knowledge, etc). The network founder echoed this,
noting that safeguarding transactions amongst par-
ticipants is an important prerequisite for firms to
participate in collaborative projects, and coordinating
participant exchanges must accompany this safe-
guarding once the project becomes operational. Coor-
dinating exchanges in Zea Partners is achieved by
having transparent and shared routines, supporting
technologies, and mechanisms for discussion/col-
laboration. Safeguarding involved having mecha-
nisms for conflict resolution and encouraging mutual
trust. The full set of indicators for coordinating and
safeguarding exchanges is shown in Table 4. Given
the evidence from Zea Partners, we can refine Propo-
sition 1 by specifying two hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1 (H1). Coordinating exchanges enables
the access to and transfer of strategic resources.
Hypothesis 2 (H2). Safeguarding exchanges enables
the access to and transfer of strategic resources.
3.3.2. How Social Mechanisms Facilitate Coordi-
nating and Safeguarding Exchanges. The Zea Part-
ners network meets the preconditions for network
governance as described by extant research (e.g., Jones
et al. 1997). The availability of contracts is subject to
what the network founder calls “valleys and peaks.”
The OSS domain is characterized by constant changes
in knowledge and technology, leading to a require-
ment for information dissemination amongst firms.
Feller et al.: A Study of Socially Enabled Business Exchanges in Open Source Service Networks
Information Systems Research 19(4), pp. 475–493, © 2008 INFORMS 483
Table 4 Empirical Indicators for Coordinating, Safeguarding, and Access/Transfer Constructs
Construct Definition Indicators
Access to, and
transfer of,
strategic
resources
The (i) potential of the network to
help members acquire
value-adding resources, and
(ii) degree to which
value-adding resources are
acquired by firms as a result of
their membership of the
network
• Network membership is designed to enhance the reputation of member firms
• The network is designed to enable members to gain access to the skills/expertise of
other members
• The network is designed to enable member firms to share customer contacts
• The network is designed to enable member firms to compete for contracts that they
couldn’t compete for on their own
• The network is designed to enable member firms to gain access to the experiences/
knowledge of other members
• Firms believe that their reputation outside of the network is enhanced by their
membership of the network
• Member firms have benefited from the skills/expertise of other members
• Firms have benefited from the sharing of customer contacts with other members
• Firms, in conjunction with other members, have competed for contracts that they could
not have done on their own
Coordinating
exchanges
The ease with which interactions
between members are con-
ducted
• Information on the skills and abilities of network members is readily available
• Firms find it easy to work with other network members because they are flexible and
willing to adapt
• Firms find it easy to work with other network members because they use common open
source tools and conventions
• Firms find it easy to voice their opinions in network decision making
• The network has transparent routines for coordinating work between member firms
• Firm use IT (e.g., mailing lists, VoIP) to coordinate activities
• Firms use face-to-face meetings to coordinate activities
• The network enables seamless hand-off of tasks between member firms
Safeguarding
exchanges
The degree to which interactions
between members is protected
• The cost of interacting with other network members is low
• Firms believe that opportunistic behavior by one member at the expense of other members
is unlikely
• Interactions between firms are based on mutual trust
• Interactions between firms are guided by the ideals of the open source movement
• Rules and procedures exist to deal with problems that arise between members
• Network members can manage conflicts to reach compromise
These factors produce the precondition that Jones et al.
term demand uncertainty. The small size (typically <10
people), geographic/linguistic limitations, and spe-
cialized knowledge of member firms limit the size,
location, and complexity of the contracts that they can
bid for. The network helps overcome demand uncer-
tainty by allowing firms to pool resources to compete
for larger/global contracts. In competing on the basis
of a “whole product,” the network allows partners
to offer a full range of value chain activities rather
than concentrating exclusively on their own special-
ties. Task complexity is also evident, because produc-
ing the “whole product” for a wide range of markets
and customers requires the inputs of specialists across
a range of business functions. Customized exchanges
high in human asset specificity are recognizable as mem-
ber firms collaborate to produce a customized prod-
uct/service that is not easily transferred. Interfirm
routines are learned emergently through the collab-
orative process rather than by prior agreement. Due
to geographical distance, network members collabo-
rate and frequently exchange knowledge in a digital
environment. Ongoing interactions between member
firms and the mutual sharing of partners, clients,
and contacts with the wider OSS community all pro-
vide evidence of structural embeddedness, and thus the
possibility of using social mechanisms to overcome
exchange problems.
Access to the Zea Partners network is restricted
based on perceptions of a firm’s professionalism, reli-
ability, trustworthiness, and performance (reputation)
in the OSS community, as well as previous interac-
tions with member firms. According to the network
founder,
! ! ! the best barometer that we have is the way peo-
ple act in the community. If they are a competent
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Table 5 Empirical Indicators for Social Mechanism Constructs
Construct Definition Indicators
Restricted
access
Having network membership
restricted for strategic
purposes
• Firms believe that the number of firms in the network is limited for strategic reasons
• Firms believe that the size of the network makes it easy to know the competencies and
activities of other members
• To become members of the network, candidate firms must have skills/expertise that are
beneficial to the existing members
• To become members of the network, candidate firms must be known to, or have a prior
relationship with, existing members
• To become members of the network, candidate firms must demonstrate commitment to
the ideals of open source software
Macroculture Having shared assumptions and
values that guide actions and
create typical behavior patterns
by member firms
• Member firms share a sense of belonging (identity)
• Member firms share a common software development philosophy
• Member firms share accepted ways of doing business
• Member firms share a common set of goals for the network
• Member firms share a sense of mutual interest
• Member firms share a sense of common destiny
Collective
sanctions
Ways in which member firms that
violate shared norms, values
and goals are punished
• The reputation of a member firm would be damaged if they behaved unacceptably
• Member firms may be excluded from projects if they behave unacceptably
• Member firms may be expelled from the network if they behave unacceptably
Reputation The assessment of firms’
competence, skills, character,
reliability, etc. within the
network
• Firms consider the competence and skills of other member firms before doing business
with them
• Firms consider the character and reliability of other member firms before doing business
with them
• Firms expect other members to fulfill their obligations because they are members of the
network
• Firms consider it important to be regarded by other members as being professionally
competent
• Firms consider it important to be regarded by other members as being reliable and
trustworthy
• Firms consider it important to fulfill their obligations to other members to maintain their
reputation within the network
developer then you can see them send mails to the
mailing lists, do check-ins and file bug reports, write
papers for conferences and all those sorts of things.
There are a multitude of avenues available ! ! ! to show
their competence. If someone is invisible from all those
avenues, that itself says something about them ! ! ! "In
addition#, if you have done business with someone
who is already trusted in the network then that trust
applies to you.
Consequently, restricted access is not just about
keeping numbers low, it is a strategic restriction; firms
have to fit in with the shared values $macroculture%
and needs of the network, as well as exhibit a com-
mitment to Zea Partners’ success.
The network’s macroculture is typical of values
associated with OSS communities; the involvement
of users (customers) as equal partners, the visibility
of actions, etc. However, this macroculture is evident
not just as a shared set of values (including beliefs,
language, etc) as proposed by Jones et al. (1997) but
also includes the mechanisms by which these ideas
are expressed and shared. For example, the Network
Founder describes the centrality of the digital net-
work to coordinating exchanges as “it’s a little bit
like asking a fish how important is water ! ! !These
"technologies# are so intrinsic that you don’t really
think in terms of living without them.” This is a richer
view of the cultural process and is in line with the
thinking of Hannerz (1992) on cultural complexity
in information societies. Once in the network, failure
to continue to adhere to the prevailing macroculture
could result in damaged reputation and/or exclu-
sion from projects or, indeed, the network $collective
sanctions%. The network founder further explains: “we
had one "firm# that we had to decline their re-
participation and we had two "firms# that we had to
confront a divergent opinion about the outcome and,
on mutual accord, they didn’t continue participating.”
Details of how the four social mechanisms are mani-
fested in Zea Partners are shown in Table 5.
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In relation to overcoming exchange problems in
Zea Partners, the Network Founder explained; “social
mechanisms are the only thing. This is an opt-in kind
of system.” The role of social mechanisms was con-
firmed by the member firms who described how such
mechanisms (discussed further below) were used to
facilitate coordinating and safeguarding exchanges.
We find support for Proposition 2, and conclude that
social mechanisms facilitate coordinating and safe-
guarding exchanges. We now examine how social
mechanisms do so.
3.3.3. How Social Mechanisms Facilitate Coordi-
nating Exchanges. The manner in which social mech-
anisms facilitate coordinating exchanges is shown
in Table 6. The role of restricted access in coordi-
nating exchanges was considered to be particularly
important by the founders and managing partners of
the network. However, there was little evidence that
this view was shared by those that were not involved
in the initial design of the network. The network
founder explained that the network
! ! ! focuses on people who’ve already decided they’re
interested in OSS, not people who don’t understand
value and values. The prime consideration is to make
sure that the fabric that holds this experiment together
doesn’t get torn.
Table 6 How Social Mechanisms Facilitate Coordinating Exchanges
Restricted
access
• Facilitating the establishment of routines for working
together
• Reducing coordination cost through increased
visibility
• Adopting deliberate membership requirements
facilitating a component-based approach to work
allocation
• Giving members a voice in decision making
• Reducing variances that parties bring to the exchanges
(facilitates mutual adjustment)
• Establishing routines for working together
Macroculture • Fostering a culture of network agility
• Ensuring new members fit into network’s culture
• Creating a sense of mutual interest (good Karma)
• Preventing fear of lock-in
• Reducing information/knowledge asymmetries
Collective
sanctions
• Encourages firms to be transparent in their dealings
with other members
• Encourages firms to act in a manner that is regarded
as competent and professional
• Encourages firms to behave in line with network
expectations
He further explained
! ! !about 50% of the "coordination# problem is solved
by working the same way we worked "in OSS
communities#. The companies have a set of tools, a
way of working together, a common culture and ways
of communication that we use on Zea projects.
It is also evident that coordinating exchanges is fa-
cilitated by the desire of members to demonstrate that
they adhere to the values of the network by acting
in a manner that is considered to be competent and
professional. The consequences of not acting in this
manner include damage to their reputation as well as
exclusion from projects and/or the network (i.e., col-
lective sanctions). They thus strive to be flexible and
transparent in their dealings with other members,
and to abide by the norms that govern participa-
tion in open source development communities. We
therefore conclude that collective sanctions, as well
as restricted access and macroculture, facilitate coor-
dinating exchanges, and we refine Proposition 2A by
proposing three hypotheses:
Hypothesis 3 (H3). Restricted access facilitates coor-
dinating exchanges.
Hypothesis 4 (H4). Macroculture facilitates coordi-
nating exchanges.
Hypothesis 5 (H5). Collective sanctions facilitate
coordinating exchanges.
3.3.4. How Social Mechanisms Facilitate Safe-
guarding Exchanges. The manner in which social
mechanisms facilitate the safeguarding of exchanges
is shown in Table 7. The table illustrates that
reputation and collective sanctions facilitate safe-
guarding exchanges as predicted. Indeed, collective
sanctions are seen to facilitate safeguarding exchanges
in the same manner as they facilitate coordinating
exchanges. The network founder describes instances
where “people said yes to a Zea project but were actu-
ally overbooked ! ! ! this affects their reputation within
the network.” He believes that
! ! !whenever you have a commons, somebody is going
to be the shark and try to hijack the commons, and
have a winner take all mentality. And you can fight
back in the courts, but that takes a lot of time; compa-
nies are dead before you get remedied and it’s a lot of
money ! ! ! if you get kicked out of the network, that’s
just as bad as getting sued, as word will get around to
your potential customers.
Feller et al.: A Study of Socially Enabled Business Exchanges in Open Source Service Networks
486 Information Systems Research 19(4), pp. 475–493, © 2008 INFORMS
Table 7 How Social Mechanisms Facilitate Safeguarding Exchanges
Macroculture • Balancing commercial interests with network
objectives
• Taking an ethical approach to commercial issues
• Creating an environment of trust
Collective sanctions • Encourages firms to be transparent in their
dealings with other members
• Encourages firms to act in a manner that is
regarded as competent and professional
• Encourages firms to behave in line with network
expectations
Reputation • Acting as a prerequisite for participation
• Rewarding good behavior
• Ensuring that there are economic consequences of
reputation
This is confirmed by the owner of Bubblenet: “Get-
ting a reputation in the community is very important;
other companies will send me projects that they can-
not handle.”
As is evident from Table 7, the social mechanisms
that facilitate safeguarding exchanges include macro-
culture rather than restricted access as previously pre-
dicted. The network founder believes that restricted
access reduces the danger of opportunistic behavior
because “each applicant we evaluate has to accept a
mutual respect culture. We have had cases where we
felt they might be ‘disruptive’ and so we said no.”
However, the study demonstrates that Zea members
believe that the culture within the network (rather
than just restricting access) is much more important
in safeguarding exchanges. The owner of Bubblenet
says that “most of us are in this for the lifestyle rather
than purely to make money; that’s difficult to formal-
ize.” The director of Blue Fountain reveals that “we
do three things: transparency, integrity, and honesty. If
there’s a problem we’ll always put our hand up.” The
chief architect of Plone Solutions reported that “We
wouldn’t leave a client hanging just because it didn’t
suit us to go back to that deployment. It’s a value
thing.” We thus refine Proposition 2B by proposing
three hypotheses:
Hypothesis 6 (H6). Collective sanctions facilitate
safeguarding exchanges.
Hypothesis 7 (H7). Reputation facilitates safeguard-
ing exchanges.
Hypothesis 8 (H8). Macroculture facilitates safe-
guarding exchanges.
In conclusion, the case study allowed us to (i) test
and refine our theoretical propositions, (ii) delineate
empirical measures for our constructs (Tables 4 and 5),
and (iii) explain how social mechanisms facilitate coor-
dinating and safeguarding exchanges (Tables 6 and 7).
We can now refine our model through a series of
hypotheses (Figure 2).
4. Further Investigation of the Model
Using a Survey of OSSNs
In the next stage of the study, we sought to tri-
angulate by using a quantitative analysis of survey
data to investigate the model (Figure 2) that had
emerged from the case study. A survey questionnaire
was constructed based on the empirical indicators
that emerged from the qualitative study (see Tables 4
and 5). This questionnaire was then pretested using
three practitioners with experience in OSS networks.
Following this, we considered the issue of population
and sampling.
We searched public domain material to determine
the existence of other networks that met the defini-
tion of an OSSN, and we secured the cooperation
of three additional OSSNs. These were: CIRS (Con-
sortium Italicum Ratione Soluta), comprising partner
companies based in Italy and focusing on providing
“best of breed” OSS mostly for public administra-
tion; ObjectWeb, a multinational network focused on
providing open source middleware solutions; and the
Open Source Consortium, a UK network focused on
OSS provision for the public sector. The principal con-
tact in each of these OSSNs promoted our online sur-
vey to the members. We eventually received a total of
71 valid and usable responses.
Because the survey was online, and our contact
was with a representative of the network rather than
the individual member firms, we could not accu-
rately estimate the total population size. The issue
of nonresponse bias was, thus, quite important. We
investigated this through the use of late respon-
dents as surrogates for nonrespondents (Wallace and
Mellor 1988). We compared the responses of a sam-
ple of 20 early respondents with 20 late respondents.
Although early respondents tended to have slightly
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Figure 2 Refined Model and Hypotheses
Restricted
access
Macroculture
Coordinating
exchanges
H3
H5
H7
H4
H6
H1
H2
H8
Collective
sanctions
Reputation
Access to,
and transfer
resources
Safeguarding
exchanges
of, strategic
Note. H1–H8 refer to hypotheses.
more experience of the OSS phenomenon than the
sampled cohort of late respondents, there were no
statistically significant differences $p < 0!05% between
responses of early and late respondents in other areas.
4.1. Survey Analysis
As shown in Table 8, the survey respondents were
primarily in senior management positions in small
firms (fewer than 20 employees) with considerable
personal and organizational experience in the open
source field.
We investigated the reliability of factors as outlined
in Table 9, which shows descriptive statistics, corre-
lations and Cronbach’s & values. The Cronbach’s &
values (in parentheses on the diagonal) ranged from
Table 8 Demographic Profile of Respondents
Respondent
experience of Org experience
Role Employees OSS (yrs) of OSS (yrs)
Technical 29% 1–5 44% <1 3% <1 4%
Managerial 20% 6–20 42% 1–5 28% 1–5 37%
Owner/director 51% 21–100 7% >5 69% >5 59%
101–1,000 3%
>1,000 4%
0.53 to 0.87. The two factors with the lower & values
are a reflection of the low number of items making
up these factors because Cronbach’s & is affected by
scale length. Also, our constructs in these cases were
formative and, as such, & values may be more moder-
ate (cf. Petter et al. 2007). There were no indications of
extreme cases of multicollinearity because none of the
off-diagonal correlations were above 0.80 (cf. Ghiselli
et al. 1981).
Petter et al. (2007) have identified some guidelines
for validating constructs that are formative in nature.
They stress the importance of an a priori theoreti-
cal/conceptual approach to validity. In this study, the
initial theoretical grounding of our factors in previ-
ous research helped to ensure content validity for
our constructs. Subsequently, construct validity was
addressed through basing our measures on concep-
tual analysis arising from the case study context. We
used axial coding to determine the indicators for each
construct. The validity of these indicators was then
assessed using relational and variational sampling as
recommended by Strauss and Corbin (1990). Finally,
results were confirmed in workshops with case study
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Table 9 Means, Standard Deviations, Scale Reliabilities, and Intercorrelations
Variablea M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. Restricted access 3.19 0!66 "0!55#
2. Reputation 4.31 0!62 0!19 "0!78#
3. Macroculture 3.43 0!55 0!24∗ 0!12 "0!70#
4. Collective sanctions 4.13 0!61 0!04 0!20 0!39∗∗ "0!79#
5. Coordinating exchanges 3.50 0!43 0!02 0!03 0!47∗∗ 0!46∗∗ "0!64#
6. Safeguarding exchanges 3.65 0!38 −0!07 0!04 0!30∗∗ 0!46∗∗ 0!37∗∗ "0!53#
7. Access/transfer strategic resources 3.71 0!49 0!12 0!19 0!45∗∗ 0!38∗∗ 0!41∗∗ 0!50∗∗ (0.80)
aItems measured on a five-point scale (1= strongly disagree, 5= strongly agree); Reliability coefficients in parentheses on diagonal.
N = 71, ∗p < 0!05, ∗∗p < 0!01.
participants, effectively constituting an expert panel
review process recommended by Rossiter (2002).
4.2. Hypothesis and Model Testing
The model in Figure 2 was specified and estimated
using LISREL. A covariance matrix was computed
using PRELIS, and parameters were estimated using
maximum likelihood. Missing data were imputed
using the EM (expectation maximization) algorithm
(cf. Dempster et al. 1977). The benefits of using the EM
algorithm to treat missing data, rather than traditional
methods such as listwise deletion, have been amply
demonstrated (cf. Bunting et al. 2002). The results of
the analysis are presented in Table 10.
In terms of model validity, the fit indices are
encouraging. The nonsignificant p value for ℵ2 and
its ratio to degrees of freedom being just over 1 sup-
ports this (if this ratio is less than 2, the model can
be considered well fitted, Schumacker 2004). In addi-
tion, the root mean square error of approximation
(RMSEA) with 90% confidence intervals are reported,
where a value less than 0.08 indicates a good fit with
reasonable errors of approximation in the popula-
tion (Jöreskog and Sörbom 1993, Steiger 1990). In our
model, the RMSEA value of 0.07 indicates a good fit.
The standardized root-mean-square residual (SRMR)
has been shown to be sensitive to model misspecifi-
cation and its use recommended by Hu and Bentler
(1999). Values less than 0.08 are considered to be
indicative of acceptable model fit (Hu and Bentler
1999). In our model, the SRMR value is 0.05. Finally,
in terms of fit, the GFI index of 0.96 for our model is
greater than the recommended threshold of 0.9, which
further indicates a close fit. Obviously, our small sam-
ple size is an issue, but Fan et al. (1999) have demon-
strated that with small samples the rejection rate for
Table 10 Model Fit Indices and Path Coefficients
Fit indices
ℵ2 9!33
Df 7
p value 0!23
RMSEA 0!07
90%CI (0.00–0.18)
SRMR 0!05
GFI 0!96
Paths Path coefficient
H1: coordinating exchanges 0!28∗
→ access/transfer of strategic resources
H2: Safeguarding exchanges 0!43∗
→ access/transfer of strategic resources
H3: Restricted access −0!08
→ coordinating exchanges
H4: Macroculture 0!36∗
→ coordinating exchanges
H5: collective sanctions 0!33∗
→ coordinating exchanges
H6: collective sanctions 0!41∗
→ safeguarding exchanges
H7: Reputation −0!02
→ safeguarding exchanges.
H8: Macroculture 0!17
→ safeguarding exchanges
∗p < 0!05!
ℵ2 is not inflated, and the RMSEA is relatively inde-
pendent of sample size.
In terms of hypotheses, the paths representing H1,
H2, H4, H5, and H6 (in Figure 2) were significant $p <
0!05%, and the standardized ' values are provided in
Table 10. The three paths representing hypotheses (H3,
H7, and H8) were not significant. The implications
of the analysis and a synthesis of the qualitative and
quantitative findings are discussed in the next section.
4.3. Synthesis of Qualitative and Quantitative
Findings
We have identified that to effectively deliver a
“whole product” to customers, OSSNs must enable
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member firms to access and transfer a number of key
strategic resources (e.g., skills/competencies, experi-
ences/knowledge, and customer contacts). In tradi-
tional business networks, formal/legal arrangements
are used for coordinating exchanges and safeguard-
ing exchanges in order to enable such access/transfer
of strategic resources (H1, H2). However, the estab-
lishment of the agreements (contracts) and the legal
recourse available to participants (litigation) when
agreements are violated incurs substantial overheads
in their implementation and lack flexibility. In con-
trast, in OSSNs, macroculture (shared assumptions
and values that guide actions and create typical
behavior patterns) is central to effectiveness because
(i) it allows firms to work easily without the imposi-
tion of formal agreements; and (ii) because the spe-
cific macroculture observed in OSSNs reflects that of
OSS communities, there is an emphasis on collab-
oration, sharing, and the preservation of the “com-
mons”. Similarly, when member firms violate shared
norms, values, and goals, the ways in which they
are punished (collective sanctions) are a very power-
ful tool for coordinating exchanges and safeguarding
exchanges (H5, H6). The size of typical member firms
and the commercial importance of network mem-
bership, both in terms of enhanced reputation and
bidding leverage, serve to increase the potency of
the specific collective sanctions observed. Potential
damage to reputation, the threat of exclusion from
projects, and the possibility of expulsion from the
network all serve to ensure that firms behave as pro-
scribed by the macroculture (thus facilitating coor-
dinating exchanges (H4)), and that violators can be
dealt with more effectively than with recourse to legal
action (thus facilitating safeguarding exchanges).
Although both our qualitative and quantitative
analyses provided evidence for the roles played by
macroculture and collective sanctions, there were dif-
ferences between the two parts of the study vis-à-vis
the mechanisms of restricted access and reputation.
The qualitative analysis revealed the importance of
restricting network membership for strategic purposes
for coordinating exchanges. Coordinating exchanges is
facilitated not just by limiting the size of the network
(which makes interactions more visible), but by mak-
ing it easier for members to work together by reducing
the variances in the types of participants involved. The
quantitative analysis, however, revealed no significant
relationship between restricted access and coordinat-
ing exchanges (H3). Similarly, the qualitative analy-
sis revealed that the assessment of firms’ competence,
skills, character, reliability, etc. (reputation), facilitates
safeguarding exchanges (H7) by ensuring that only
those that are least likely to disrupt the operations of
the network become involved. The quantitative anal-
ysis revealed no significant relationship between rep-
utation and safeguarding exchanges.
We explain the lack of support for these particular
hypotheses as follows: The differences between the
qualitative case study (which was informed primar-
ily by participants at the network design level) and
the quantitative analysis (which was based on data
gathered from a larger and more diverse population)
offers us the opportunity to potentially distinguish
between the social mechanisms used primarily at a
network design level and those that are important
for both design and ongoing operations. Coordinating
and safeguarding exchanges on a day-to-day basis is
facilitated by macroculture and collective sanctions as
previously described. However, at the network design
level, restricted access and reputation are also utilized
to ensure that only those that are least likely to dis-
rupt the operations of the network (either through
incompetence or misbehavior) become involved; thus
facilitating coordinating exchanges and safeguarding
exchanges. Once in the network, these mechanisms
become less important; members must adhere to the
prevailing macroculture or face collective sanctions.
Nevertheless, despite the lack of significance for some
hypotheses, the overall model (Figure 2) was shown
to be a good fit to our sample data, and no additional
or alternative hypothetical paths were suggested by
the quantitative analysis.
Overall, it is evident that the interplay between
digital and social networks is particularly strong in
OSSNs because the four social mechanisms are inher-
ently dependent upon the underlying IT infrastruc-
ture. Much of the collaborative development activity
within an OSSN takes place in the digital environ-
ments of open source community sites. Even when the
production of software is not intended for release into
the “commons” (e.g., where customizations are being
created for a specific client), the OSSNs continue to
use the OSS collaborative development infrastructure.
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Additionally, ongoing communication between firms
is dependent on e-mail/mailing lists, VoIP, Internet
chat, etc. These collaborative and communicative IT
environments create a visible and persistent record of
participants’ activities. This transparency means that a
members’ (or potential members’) adherence to (and
violation of) shared values and goals are immediately
evident to all.
5. Conclusion
This study has articulated the “productization” chal-
lenge associated with delivering peer-produced goods
to consumers, and has identified the open source ser-
vice network (OSSN), an emerging business network
archetype designed to meet this challenge for open
source software. OSSNs are of scientific and practical
interest for a number of reasons.
• First, OSSNs demonstrate that a business net-
work model can be particularly effective in deliv-
ering the “whole product” needed to commercially
exploit peer-produced goods. OSSNs, thus, directly
address key challenges in the commercialization of
open source software, and are of interest to both
research and practice.
• Second, the ways in which OSSNs overcome
exchange problems contrast with other business net-
works in that social mechanisms play a primary role
in coordinating and safeguarding exchanges amongst
participants.
• Third, the IT infrastructure utilized by OSSNs
builds upon the collaborative development and com-
munication environments found in OSS communi-
ties, and is focused on enabling rich, transparent
interactions between firms. This is in contrast to the
transaction-oriented focus of other interorganizational
systems.
5.1. Implications for Practice
We have demonstrated that firms seeking to “pro-
ductize” the software goods created by peer pro-
duction communities in a sustainable and profitable
fashion must; (1) maintain a productive relation-
ship with these communities; (2) easily and safely
exchange resources with each other in order to deliver
the “whole product;” and (3) fulfill their contrac-
tual obligations to customers, thus leaving little room
for error and recovery. We have shown that OSSNs,
by leveraging both the IT infrastructure and social
mechanisms characteristic of open source communi-
ties, are able to effectively address these concerns. For
firms seeking to meet these or similar challenges, we
see three specific, actionable implications of the cur-
rent study.
First, the membership of such business networks
must be carefully managed to facilitate the use of
social mechanisms as a low-overhead, flexible means
to overcome exchange problems. Specifically, we have
shown that one of the roles of the network designer
is to assess potential members and restrict access to
the network, thus allowing participants to rely on
macroculture and collective sanctions for the day-to-
day coordinating and safeguarding exchanges.
Second, the use of social mechanisms to overcome
exchange problems is only possible if the actions of
members are persistently visible to the rest of the
network. Our study implies that the mode of oper-
ation evident in OSSNs is inherently dependent on
the interactioncentric IT infrastructure used, and that
it would not be possible to implement such a system
using the transactioncentric infrastructure characteris-
tic of many interorganizational networks.
Third, our study indicates that actively participat-
ing in noncommercial peer production communities
(e.g., OSS projects) is an effective way for firms to
acquire the competencies needed to participate in
OSSNs (or similar networks). This implies that the
barriers to entry for OSSN formation, operation, and
participation are lower for firms emerging from peer
production communities than for firms coming from
outside these communities.
5.2. Implications for Research
The four-phase process described in the paper (defin-
ing and bounding an emergent and observable phe-
nomenon, articulating propositions based on extant
research, refining our preliminary model through
qualitative case study analysis, and further refin-
ing the model through quantitative analysis of sur-
vey data) proved to be a highly effective process.
Specifically, the methodological pluralism of the study
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was particularly useful in addressing a social phe-
nomenon, which requires both broad and deep anal-
ysis. We therefore call for multimethod research on
social mechanisms in overcoming exchange problems
in both OSS communities and in business networks
other than OSSNs. In addition to calling for repli-
cation studies, our work has implications for how
researchers should conceptualize their studies of busi-
ness networks and interorganizational systems.
Existing research (as discussed in §2) has primar-
ily considered the design of business networks from
the perspective of how processes, structures, and tech-
nologies implement the formal/legal agreements that
characterize business activities. Almost no attention
has been given to the use of informal mechanisms as
an explicit design consideration in business networks.
It is therefore not surprising that, in addressing the
issue of commercializing peer-produced goods in con-
junction with peer production communities, the domi-
nant perspective has been on integrating communities
into prevailing business practices. However, our study
reveals the importance of community-based practices
to business success, and thus implies the need for
researchers to fully address the potential impact of
both business and community practices/structures in
commercializing peer-produced goods.
Finally, we call for research that reconsiders the role
of interorganizational systems in business networks.
Extant research primarily frames interorganizational
systems in the context of transactions that implement
formal/legal agreements, and does not recognize the
role played by such systems in supporting the inter-
actions characteristic of social action networks. We
see the need to focus on designing digital interorga-
nizational infrastructures to facilitate the full range
of primary interactions that characterize interorgani-
zational activities, rather than just implementing the
secondary arrangements that govern them.
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